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THE END OF AN ERA: SUBURBAN VILLAGE AVERSION IN
CITIZENS FOR MOUNT VERNON v. CITY OF MOUNT VERNON
Ronda Larson
Abstract: In 1990, the Washington Legislature enacted the Growth Management Act
(GMA) to counteract problems related to unmanaged population growth. The GMA
fundamentally altered two traditional aspects of land use law: the disregard for planning
documents and the aversion to mixing uses within zones. Counties and cities planning under
the Act now must have comprehensive plans and zoning ordinances that are consistent with
those plans. They are also encouraged to use innovative zoning tools such as mixed-use
housing developments. In the 1997 case Citizens for Mount Vernon v. City of Mount Vernon,
the Supreme Court of Washington applied pre-GMA common law to decide the effect of
comprehensive plans on specific land use decisions. It held that zoning ordinances supersede
inconsistent comprehensive plans in such decisions. This Note analyzes Mount Vernon and
concludes that the Supreme Court of Washington needlessly clung to pre-GMA notions that
avoid planning and mixed-use zoning in residential districts. This Note recommends that the
court abandon pre-GMA case law in future land use cases and consider bifurcating the
standard ofjudicial review of land use cases.
In 1990, the Washington Legislature performed major surgery on state
land use law. The enactment of the Growth Management Act' (GMA)
brought Washington into the exclusive league of states waging a "quiet
revolution"2 in land use regulatory law. The Act subjugated a seventy-
1. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 36.70A, 36.70B, 36.70C, & 82.02 (1998).
2. See James H. Wickersham, The Quiet Revolution Continues: The Emerging New Model for
State Growth Management Statutes, 18 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 489, 489, 512-13 (1994) (describing
growth management statutes of two early participants in "quiet revolution": Florida and Vermont).
Land use regulation traditionally has been the prerogative of local govemment, with little
interference from state or federal government. George E.H. Gay, State Solutions to Growth
Management: Vermont, Oregon, and a Synthesis, Nat. Resources & Env't, Winter 1996, at 13, 13.
But, since the early 1970s, 10 states have passed state growth management statutes that alter the
local home rule and endeavor to coordinate regionally local land development policies. They are
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Maine, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, and
Washington. See Symposium, Growth Management and the Environment in the 1990s, 24 Loy. L.A.
L. Rev. 905 (1991). Characteristic of all growth management states is the move away from the
prevailing pattern of low-density, monofunctional sprawl toward higher-density, more compact
development. Wickersham, supra, at 511-12. This is a stark change from Euclidean zoning, or local
zoning, which is used in the majority of states. Euclidean zoning is named after the 1926 case,
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., in which the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of zoning against a takings challenge. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Wickersham has noted that growth
management controls implemented solely at the local level, as in Euclidean zoning, are no longer
appropriate for the metropolitan areas that characterize modem America. Wickersham, supra, at 512.
Those who oppose state government's more active role in land use regulation can take comfort in
an international comparison. Fearing that a loss of more farmland will leave China unable to feed its
1.2 billion people, the Chinese government has enacted a law that threatens the death penalty for
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year history of land use regulation by requiring planning as the
foundation for all zoning actions4 and replacing the Euclidian tendency to
strictly segregate uses5 with the aim of mixing land uses to make
communities liveable. The Act was primarily a response to gridlock
traffic and losses in natural resource lands that occurred because of
population growth and suburban sprawl in the Puget Sound region.7
Despite the GMA's changes, the Supreme Court of Washington has
continued to invoke pre-GMA legal doctrine.8 In Citizens for Mount
Vernon v. City of Mount Vernon, the court held that the comprehensive
plan is only a guide, not a legal imperative; when zoning regulations and
those who build on farmland without obtaining extensive and hard-to-get permits. Rena Singer,
China's Answer to Urban Sprawl: Death Penalty, Seattle Times, Feb. 12, 1999, at Al.
For a list of useful writings on growth management, see Quintin Johnstone, Government Control
ofUrban Land Use: A Comparative Major Program Analysis, 39 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 373, 416-17
n.143 (1994). For an in-depth analysis of the Washington Growth Management Act and its
legislative history, see Richard L. Settle & Charles G. Gavigan, The Growth Management
Revolution in Washington: Past, Present, and Future, 16 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 867 (1993).
3. Before the GMA, Washington's planning enabling statutes primarily governed its counties' and
cities' planning and zoning powers. These statutes have remained largely unchanged since their
original enactment in the 1920s. Land Use Study Commission Final Report, at ch. 8 (last modified
Dec. 1998) <http://www.cted.wa.gov/lgd/landusetreportlehapterS.html#c822> (citing Wash. Rev.
Code §§ 35.63, 35A.63, & 36.70 (1998)).
4. See infra Part II.B.
5. See supra note 2 and infra Part I.B.
6. See infra Part II.B.
7. See Settle & Gavigan, supra note 2, at 871. Contrary to popular belief, population growth
probably has not been the direct cause of problems such as sprawl and traffic congestion. Christine
A. Klein, A Requiem for the Rollover Rule: Capital Gains, Farmland Loss, and the Law of
Unintended Consequences, 55 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 403, 454 (1998). For example, in the Puget
Sound region, traffic congestion and loss of natural resource lands became the source of widespread
concern in the late 1980s, but the area's population growth rate was actually greater between 1940
and 1979 than during the 1980s and 1990s. Keith Dearborn, an attorney and educator who helped
write the GMA and was a member of the legislature's Land Use Study Commission, attributes the
problems to the following factors in conjunction with growth: (1) the number ofjobs in city centers
is increasing faster than the number of people living in city centers; (2) most cities in Washington
are the least dense in the nation, and are far less dense than cities in most other countries; (3) the
average household size is shrinking; (4) the number of cars owned and miles driven per person is
increasing; and (5) the proportion of local tax dollars being invested in infrastructure has dropped
precipitously as a greater proportion goes toward criminal justice and public safety. Keith Dearborn,
Lecture on Washington Environmental Regulations at the University of Washington School of Law
(Jan. 12, 1999) (PowerPoint presentation on file with author); see also Peter Calthorpe, The Next
American Metropolis: Ecology, Community, and the American Dream 18 (1993) (discussing current
mismatch between suburban settlement patterns and American culture and attributing it to declining
household sizes and shifting job locations).
8. See Weyerhaeuser v. Pierce County, 124 Wash. 2d 26, 43, 873 P.2d 498, 507 (1994) ("[A]
specific zoning ordinance will prevail, even over an inconsistent comprehensive plan.").
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the plan conflict, the plan must yield.' Because it conflicted with the
zoning ordinance, the court invalidated the city's grant of a permit to
build a planned unit development that would have put a grocery store and
other commercial uses on eight acres of a forty-acre housing
development." The court held that even if the development were
consistent with the city's comprehensive plan, comprehensive plans are
not appropriate documents for making specific land use decisions."
This Note argues that Mount Vernon applied anachronistic common
law to resolve an inconsistency between planning and zoning, and in
doing so, defeated fundamental goals of the GMA. Part I discusses the
historic tendencies in American land use law to disregard planning and
strictly segregate land uses within zones. Part II describes the GMA's
fundamental shift away from these two tendencies and the GMA's other
impacts on Washington land use law. Part III discusses the Supreme
Court of Washington's decision in Mount Vernon. Part IV criticizes the
Mount Vernon opinion, particularly the court's insistence on adhering to
vestigial remnants of land use common law that the GMA has
superseded. Finally, this Note argues that the Supreme Court of
Washington will be less inclined to use pre-GMA case law as it becomes
more familiar with the GMA, and that Mount Vernon thus represents the
end of an era in state land use law.
I. LAND USE LAW: FOUNDATION AND CONSEQUENCES
Zoning and land use regulation in the United States first gained
momentum in the 1920s when state legislatures began to delegate zoning
and planning powers to local governments. The development of land use
law thereafter reflected two particular emphases that continue into the
present day. First, land use ordinances in most states lack overarching
planning schemes to guide them.'" Second, land use law tends to adhere
to homogeneous residential zoning, especially by excluding commercial
uses and multi-family housing from single-family residential zones. 3
9. 133 Wash. 2d 861, 873, 947 P.2d 1208, 1215 (1997).
10. Id. at 863, 876-77,947 P.2d at 1210, 1216; see infra notes 119-29 and accompanying text.
11. Id. at 873, 947 P.2d at 1214 (stating that although GMA suggests comprehensive plan can be
used to make specific land use decision, Washington case law holds otherwise).
12. Richard F. Babcock & Charles L. Siemon, The Zoning Game Revisited 261 (1985).
13. See Garett Power, The Unwisdom ofAllowing City Growth to Work Out Its Own Destiny, 47
Md. L. Rev. 626, 670 (1988).
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More recently, practitioners and scholars have criticized these hallmarks
of traditional land use planning. 4
A. Disregard for Comprehensive Planning
The disregard for planning stems from a number of influences. One
important factor was that originally, zoning enabling acts lacked
planning mandates. Such statutes are used on the state level to delegate
zoning and planning powers to local governments." Most state planning
and zoning enabling acts are based on two U.S. Department of
Commerce model statutes 6 that do not require adoption of a local
comprehensive plan as a separate document from zoning ordinances. 7
Absent such a requirement, local governments have lacked mandates for
planning from the outset. Consequently, they usually adopt zoning
ordinances based on site-specific needs rather than county-wide or
regional concerns. 8 This was the case in Washington until the GMA
became law. 9
14. See infra notes 23, 40-43,51-56 and accompanying text.
15. Donald G. Hagman & Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, Urban Planning and Land Development
Control Law § 2.7, at 21 (2d ed. 1986).
16. Id. § 2.11, at 29. See A Standard State Zoning Enabling Act Under Which Municipalities May
Adopt Zoning Regulations (Advisory Comm. on Zoning, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, recommended
1926), reprinted in American Law Inst., Model Land Dev. Code app. A, at 210 (Tentative Draft
No. 1, 1968); A Standard City Planning Enabling Act (Advisory Comm. on City Planning & Zoning,
U.S. Dep't of Commerce 1928), reprinted in U.S. Standards Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
Building and Housing Publication no. 11.
17. A Standard State Zoning Enabling Act states that local governments are to make their zoning
decisions "in accordance with a comprehensive plan," but the Act gives no clear guidelines on how
to do this. See Hagman & Juergensmeyer, supra note 15, § 2.13, at 31. Consequently, judicial
decisions have filled the void. Many courts have accepted the concept of the plan being embodied in
the zoning ordinance itself; thus, the plan need not be a separate document from the ordinance. See,
e.g., Woodford v. Zoning Comm'n, 156 A.2d 470, 472 (Conn. 1959); Green v. County Council, 508
A.2d 882, 889 (Del. Ch. 1986); Kozesnik v. Township of Montgomery, 131 A.2d 1, 7 (N.J. 1957),
overruled by N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40:55D-62 (West 1999); Skenesborough Stone Inc. v. Village of
Whitehall, 679 N.Y.S.2d 727, 730 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); see also Charles M. Haar, "In
Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan," 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1154, 1157 (1955). Before 1990, the
Supreme Court of Washington adhered to this embodied-plan concept, reasoning that the
requirement for a comprehensive plan was satisfied if a zoning ordinance reflected an integrated,
rational pattern of zoning with an underlying rationale or purpose, "beyond a piecemeal approach."
Richard L. Settle, Washington Land Use and Environmental Law and Practice § 1.5(a), at 7-8
(1983) (internal quotations omitted); see, e.g., Shelton v. City of Bellevue, 73 Wash. 2d 28, 36-37,
435 P.2d 949, 954 (1968); City of Medina v. Rose, 69 Wash. 2d 448, 451,418 P.2d 462,464 (1966).
18. Concerning this tendency in Washington State, see Settle & Gavigan, supra note 2, at 869-70.
A Florida appellate court described how rezoning is granted not only on the basis of the land's
suitability to the new zoning classification and compatibility with surrounding zoning, but also, and
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Another reason for the lack of planning is that it does not have the
sociological impetus that originally spurred zoning." The accelerated
adoption of zoning ordinances nationwide was primarily a result of local
governments' desires to accomplish a number of social goals, including
ensuring higher property values and more tax revenue,2' separating
hazardous and offensive industries and other nuisances from homes,'
and protecting white communities from racial integration by means of
exclusionary zoning.' Because planning was not necessary to achieve
perhaps foremost, on local political considerations including who the owner is, who the objectors
are, the particular land improvement and use that is intended, and "whose ox is being fattened or
gored" by the granting or denial of the rezoning request. Snyder v. Board of County Comm'rs, 595
So.2d 65,73 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), vacated on other grounds, 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993).
19. Local government zoning and planning in Washington has been governed by a "formidable
legal thicket" of statutes, constitutional provisions, and case law. Jerome L. Hillis & Richard R.
Wilson, Land Use Planning in Washington: Overdue for Improvement, 10 Willamette L. Rev. 320,
321 (1974). These sources vary in the degree of planning that they require, but the more recent pre-
GMA decisions by the Supreme Court of Washington accord an apparently uniform weak legal
status to the comprehensive plan. Settle, supra note 17, §§ 1.5-1.7; see infra note 32. The planning
and zoning authority statutes include the Planning Commissions Act, Wash. Rev. Code § 35.63
(1998); the Planning Enabling Act, Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70.340 (1998); and the Optional
Municipal Code, Wash. Rev. Code § 35A.63 (1998). Some local governments can also plan and
zone pursuant to the broad police power grant of article XI, section I 1 of the Washington
Constitution. Hillis & Wilson, supra, at 324. The GMA did not replace pre-GMA statutory law and
says nothing about how to resolve conflicts between it and the older statutes. This has caused
confusion, and the final report of the Land Use Study Commission (LUSC) recommended that the
three separate planning enabling statutes be combined into one that applies to all cities and counties.
Final Report of the Land Use Study Commission, at ch. 8 (Dec. 1998) <http://www.cted.wa.gov/
lgd/landuse/report/chapter8.html#c85>. The legislature has not acted upon its recommendation as of
this writing.
LUSC was a commission within the state Department of Community, Trade and Economic
Development, established by the GMA to assess Washington's land use regime and make
recommendations to the legislature. The commission's term has expired. It was established by Wash.
Rev. Code §§ 90.61.010-.050, and repealed by Laws 1995, ch. 347, § 806, effective June 30, 1998.
20. See Jerry Mitchell, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan: The Rise of Strict Scrutiny in
Florida, 6 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 79, 81 (1990).
21. Id. Protecting single-family districts through exclusionary zoning results in higher tax
revenues for local governments because it excludes lower-income residents who rent. Communities
then become mainly middle and upper class and land values increase, resulting in more property
taxes for the local government See Andrew G. Dietderich, An Egalitarian's Market: The Economics
ofInclusionary Zoning Reclaimed, 24 Fordham Urb. L.J. 23, 31-32 (1996); Michael E. Lewyn, The
Urban Crisis: Made in Washington, 4 J.L. & Pol'y 513, 515 n.6 (1996).
22. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390-93 (1926) (surveying opinions
of state courts that had upheld exclusion of apartments and commercial and industrial uses from
residential districts).
23. See, e.g., Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal
Analysis, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1841, 1848-49 (1994); Power, supra note 13, at 669.
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these goals, local governments across the nation adopted the practice of
zoning, divorced from comprehensive planning practices.
Finally, highly deferential judicial review allows local decisionmakers
to bypass planning issues in land use regulation. Even in jurisdictions
that have adopted comprehensive plans, the substantive effect of these
plans is weak due to the standard of judicial review that federal and state
courts employ. 4 The U.S. Supreme Court's landmark zoning case,
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,' established the test for
determining whether local zoning actions violated the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses.26 The Court held that local land use decisions
are constitutional unless the actions are "clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare."27 The Court also established the standard of
judicial review for legislative land use actions, reasoning that if the
legislative classification for zoning purposes is fairly debatable, the
legislative judgment controls.28 Adopted by federal and most state courts
across the country,29 this standard allows local governments broad
discretion in their methods of land use regulation. If a municipality can
devise a reason after the fact for its application of the zoning ordinance, a
court will uphold the application.0 The Euclid standard involves no
inquiry into whether actions are well-planned.3' Even if a locality has
created a comprehensive plan, courts using this standard do not require
zoning ordinances to be consistent with the plan. As in Washington
24. This deference is itself a product of the fact that state legislatures have broadly delegated land
use regulating power to local governments. Thomas G. Pelham, Quasi-Judicial Rezonings: A
Commentary on the Snyder Decision and the Consistency Requirement, 9 J. Land Use & Envtl. L.
243, 245-46 (1994). The only limits on this power have traditionally been constitutional limitations
such as the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Takings Clauses. Id.
25. 272 U.S. 365.
26. Pelham, supra note 24, at 246.
27. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395.
28. Id. at 388.
29. Pelham, supra note 24, at 246.
30. Mitchell, supra note 20, at 82-83 (citing Charles L. Siemon, The Paradox of "In Accordance
with a Comprehensive Plan "' and Post Hoc Rationalizations: The Needfor Efficient and Effective
Judicial Review ofLand Use Regulations, 16 Stetson L. Rev. 603 (1987)). Commentators have said
that courts often judge a challenged action by the quality of the government's "post hoc
'rationalizations' rather than on how well-planned the action was. Mitchell, supra note 20, at 82-
83; Siemon, supra, at 606-07.
31. Mitchell, supra note 20, at 82. This may partially be due to the fact that Euclid was decided
before the creation of the first model act for planning in 1927. See Standard City Planning Enabling
Act, supra note 16.
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before enactment of the GMA, courts following the majority approach
consider the plan to be nothing more than a "blueprint" or "guide" for
future development, and require only general conformity to it.32 Because
of Euclid, most courts apply the substantial relationship test and the
fairly debatable standard, and thus disregard planning in analyzing the
validity of land use actions.
B. Emphasis on Single-Use Zoning
Along with the disregard for planning, land use regulation in the
United States has clung tenaciously to single-use zoning for the past
eighty years. As with planning, the Department of Commerce's model
statutes had a large impact on this single-use focus.33 The Standard State
Zoning Enabling Act, adopted by states across the nation, provides that
regulations should be uniform for each class of buildings in a district.34
Furthermore, the statute effectively mandates single-use zoning by
defining zones as parcels wherein all lots conform to the same
requirements of minimum lot size, yard size, and building setback
distances from neighboring lot boundaries.35 The U.S. Supreme Court
32. See 1 E.C. Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice 223, 225, & nn.34, 34.1, 34.3 & 34A (4th ed.
1978 & Supp. 1998); see also Theobald v. Board of County Comm'rs, 644 P.2d 942, 949 (Colo.
1982); First Hartford Realty Corp. v. Plan and Zoning Comm'n, 338 A.2d 490, 495 (Conn. 1973);
Grubb & Assocs., Inc. v. City of Halley, 903 P.2d 741, 750 (Idaho 1995); Coughlin v. City of
Topeka, 480 P.2d 91, 95 (Kan. 1971); Nottingham Village, Inc. v. Baltimore County, 292 A.2d 680,
687-88 (Md. 1972).
Washington courts have often discounted the importance of the comprehensive plan. See
Weyerhaeuser v. Pierce County, 124 Wash. 2d 26, 43, 873 P.2d 498, 507 (1994); Cougar Mountain
Assocs. v. King County, 111 Wash. 2d 742, 757, 765 P.2d 264, 272 (1988); Nagatani Bros., Inc. v.
Skagit County Bd. of Comm'rs, 108 Wash. 2d 477,480,739 P.2d 696, 698 (1987); Cathcart-Maltby-
Clearview Community Council v. Snohomish County, 96 Wash. 2d 201, 212, 634 P.2d 853, 860
(1981); Barie v. Kitsap County, 93 Wash. 2d 843, 849, 613 P.2d 1148, 1152 (1980); Buell v.
Bremerton, 80 Wash. 2d 518, 526, 495 P.2d 1358, 1363 (1972); Bassani v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 70 Wash. App. 389, 396, 853 P.2d 945, 950 (1993); SEAPC v. Cammack II Orchards, 49
Wash. App. 609, 616, 744 P.2d 1101, 1106 (1987); West Hill Citizens for Controlled Dev. Density
v. King County Council, 29 Wash. App. 168, 172, 627 P.2d 1002, 1005 (1981); South Hill Sewer
Dist. v. Pierce County, 22 Wash. App. 738, 745-46,591 P.2d 877, 881-82 (1979).
33. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
34. Hagman & Juergensmeyer, supra note 15, § 3.17, at 63.
35. George W. Liebmann, The Modernization of Zoning: Enabling Act Revision as a Means to
Reform, 23 Urb. Law. 1, 9-10 (1991). The statute, although based upon the German experience,
deviated from the German practice of permitting commercial uses in residential zones. While
German communities allow commercial uses in residential zones unless they cause objectionable
odors or otherwise are noxious, the American method has been the almost total prohibition of
commercial uses in residential zones. Id. at 9.
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subsequently voiced its approval of single-use zoning schemes in Euclid
when it said that the intrusion of industry and apartments into single-
family zones almost constitutes a public nuisance.36 This decision
allowed local governments to continue using zoning to insulate the
homogeneous, single-family suburb from the city."
C. Rising Frustration with Traditional Models
The absence of comprehensive planning, coupled with an exclusive
focus on single-use zones, has recently come under criticism by land use
commentators.38 With regard to comprehensive planning, scholars have
noted that without close judicial scrutiny or other incentives for planning,
the local zoning system became an irrational and politicized process.3 9
Because of the judicial deference given, land use decisions are rarely
reversed. Having a zoning decision made in one's favor at the local level
is therefore imperative. Critics argue that political favoritism and
neighborhood parochialism have rendered growth management
extremely difficult in states with population influxes," leading to losses
of natural resources," traffic congestion," and a poorer quality of life.43
Some state courts have addressed the problems of political favoritism
and parochialism by applying a standard of review stricter than the fairly
36. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394-95 (1926).
37. Richard F. Babcock, The Zoning Game: Municipal Practices and Policies 3 (1966).
38. Dissatisfaction with judicial avoidance of planning began in the planning and legal literature
during the 1950s, exemplified by the eloquent spokesman Charles M. Haar. Siemon, supra note 30,
at 611 (citing Haar, supra note 17, at 1174).
39. Pelham, supra note 24, at 246.
40. Mary Dawson, The Best Laid Plans: The Rise and Fall of Growth Management in Florida, 11
J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 325, 329 (1996).
41. Gay, supra note 2, at 13; see also Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 Cornell
L. Rev. 1, 74-76 (1997) (arguing that federal government is in much better position than states or
local governments to conserve biodiversity effectively).
42. See Anthony Downs, Stuck in Traffic: Coping with Peak-Hour Traffic Congestion 4, 160
(1992) (arguing that most effective solutions to traffic congestion involve not local but regional
planning and control of factors that affect travel patterns, and that voluntary cooperation among
various local governments in metropolitan area would be ineffective).
43. The GMA's legislative findings state in part:
The legislature finds that uncoordinated and unplanned growth, together with a lack of common
goals expressing the public's interest in the conservation and the wise use of our lands, pose a
threat to the environment, sustainable economic development, and the health, safety, and high
quality of life enjoyed by residents of this state.
Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.010 (1998).
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debatable standard to certain types of land use actions.' Most courts that
apply this stricter standard treat the rezoning of one parcel as a legislative
act.45 Accordingly, they apply the presumption of validity that usually is
applied to legislative acts, and will only find the rezoning invalid if the
decision was arbitrary and capricious.46 But, a shift in the fairly debatable
standard took place in the 1970s and 1980s.4! Fasano v. Board of County
Commissioners,48 a landmark Oregon case, established the use of a
stricter standard of review for zoning actions involving a specific parcel
of property. Adopted in several jurisdictions across the country, the
Fasano doctrine holds that individual ordinances applied by local
governments to specific situations are analogous to judicial decisions that
applied statutes to each unique set of facts.49 Site-specific rezones,
therefore, are treated as quasi-judicial and not entitled to the deference
that courts accord legislative land use actions under the fairly debatable
standard.50
44. Hagman & Juergensmeyer, supra note 15, § 6.4, at 170-72; see Board of County Comm'rs v.
Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993); Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973).
But see Martin County v. Yusem, 690 So. 2d 1288, 1293, 1295 (Fla. 1997) (holding that
amendments to comprehensive land use plans are legislative decisions subject to fairly debatable
standard of review, because such amendments are formulations of policy, rather than applications of
policy).
45. Hagman & Juergensmeyer, supra note 15, § 6A, at 169.
46. Id.
47. Mitchell, supra note 20, at 83.
48. 507 P.2d 23.
49. Hagman & Juergensmeyer, supra note 15, § 6A, at 171.
50. Mitchell, supra note 20, at 83. The difference between legislative and judicial or quasi-
judicial actions has been described as follows:
First, judicial action is narrow in scope, focusing on specific individuals or on specific
situations, while legislative action is open-ended, affecting a broad class of individuals or
situations ....
Secondly, legislative action results in the formulation of a general rule or policy, while
judicial action results in the application of a general rle or policy ....
Thirdly, it is generally stated that judicial action is retrospective, determining "[tihe rights and
duties of parties under existing law and with relation to existing facts... ." By contrast,
legislative action is said to be prospective, determining "[w]hat the law shall be in future cases.'
Carl J. Peckinpaugh, Jr., Comment, Burden of Proof in Land Use Regulation: A Unified Approach
and Application to Florida, 8 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 499, 504 (1980) (quoting Comment, Zoning
Amendments-The Product of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Action, 33 Ohio St. L.. 130, 134-36
(1972)); see also Snyder v. Board of County Comm'rs, 595 So. 2d 65, 80 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1991),
vacated on other grounds, 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993).
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The land use regulatory tradition of single-use zoning has also
received criticism in recent decades." Commentators have blamed it for
causing suburban sprawl, 2 traffic congestion,53 housing unaffordability,
54
social isolation,55 and racial segregation. 6 Many, including those in a
"neo-traditionalist" land use movement,57 advocate a shift in residential
development from single-use zoning to pedestrian-friendly, mixed-use
villages. 8 Additionally, researchers Ann Moudon and Paul Hess at the
51. See Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities 188, 198-232, 290-312
(Modem Library 1993) (1961) (explaining benefits of mixed uses and rebutting arguments against
mixed uses).
52. Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., A Century of Air Pollution Control Law: What's Worked; What's
Failed; What Might Work, 21 Envtl. L. 1549, 1571-72 (1991) (finding that Euclidean single-use
zoning leads to urban sprawl, which creates cycle of automobile dependence that continues until
transportation system dominates land); see also Wickersham, supra note 2, at 494-95; Jessica E.
Jay, Note, The "Mailing" of Vermont: Can the "Growth Center" Designation Save the Traditional
Village from Suburban Sprawl?, 21 Vt. L. Rev. 929, 939-40 (1997) (blaming conventional zoning
for causing sprawling development that lacks ambiance, character, and vitality of traditional towns).
Researchers have defined suburban sprawl, also called urban sprawl, as low density, homogeneous,
single-family residential districts sited at urban fringe of metropolitan areas. Klein, supra note 7, at
453. Commentators have described sprawl as being poorly planned, land consumptive development
designed without regard to its surroundings. Robert H. Freilich & Bruce G. Peshoff, The Social
Costs of Sprawl, 29 Urb. Law. 183, 185 (1997).
53. Robert Cervero, Jobs-Housing Balancing and Regional Mobility, 55 J. Am. Plan. Ass'n 136,
145 (1989); see also Jacobs, supra note 51, at 229-30. Eighty-six percent of all trips taken by
Americans are by car, compared with 30-48% of trips taken by Europeans. Calthorpe, supra note 7,
at 47.
54. Freilich & Peshoff, supra note 52, at 191 (attributing housing unaffordability to suburban
sprawl).
55. See Andres Duany & Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, The Second Coming of the Small Town, Utne
Reader, May/June 1992, at 93, 97; Jay, supra note 52, at 943.
56. Wickersham, supra note 2, at 496; see also Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The
Suburbanization of the United States 242 (1985) (describing how, in suburbs everywhere, zoning
was used by people who already lived in community to keep everyone else out, rigidly excluding
apartments, factories, and "blight," which were euphemisms for African Americans and poor
people); Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1047, 1047-48 (1996).
57. The neo-traditionalist concept, also called new urbanism, gained popularity in the early 1990s.
It proposes a return to neighborhood forms that existed in traditional American towns, including
mixed-use town centers, small block sizes, alley access, and a grid of local street connections. See
Calthorpe, supra note 7, at 21, 49. However, the traffic reduction benefits of the grid system have
been shown to be minimal. New urbanism's more promising components are the interspersing of
multi-family housing into single-family zones and the placement of two to four stories of apartments
above ground level shops. Interview with Ronald Kasprisin, Associate Professor, University of
Washington School of Urban Design and Planning, Seattle, Wash. (Feb. 11, 1998).
58. Such villages would be the American version of the walkable European village where housing
surrounds neighborhood centers comprised of grocery stores, cafes, and places for recreation. See
Neal Peirce & Curtis W. Johnson, A Way to Wed Conservation to Development, Seattle
Times/Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Oct. 8, 1989, at A4 (advocating building of European-style
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University of Washington have discovered that compact suburban
neighborhoods with their own commercial centers are becoming a
common neighborhood form in the Puget Sound region of Washington. 9
Called suburban clusters, ten to twenty of these communities may be
emerging every decade outside the region's cities, according to the
researchers.' These clusters are not usually transit- or pedestrian-friendly
when they are constructed, but planners believe that they already shorten
vehicle trip distances and that with some investment, they have potential
for significantly reducing the region's traffic woes.61
II. THE GMA: WASHINGTON'S DEPARTURE FROM LAND USE
LEGAL TRADITIONS
The Growth Management Act (GMA) marks Washington State's
repudiation of its longstanding aversion to planning mandates and
mixed-use zoning. The Act directs certain local governments to create
comprehensive plans and make their zoning ordinances consistent with
those plans.62 In addition, the Act encourages local governments to
mingle commercial and residential uses.6' Finally, the GMA departs from
previous common law doctrine by defining the grant of a planned unit
development (PUD) permit as a project permitting decision rather than a
rezone. Pre-GMA common law considered a PUD permit to be a rezone.'
A. Comprehensive Planning
1. The Planning Requirement
The GMA mandates a departure from the traditional anti-planning
tendencies of land use law by requiring specified counties to create
compact communities to manage growth in Puget Sound region); see also James A. Kushner,
Growth for the Twenty-First Century-Tales from Bavaria and the Vienna Woods: Comparative
Images of Planning in Munich, Salzburg Vienna, and the United States, 29 Urb. Law. 911, 947-48
(1997); Jay, supra note 52, at 942-43.
59. J. Martin McOmber, New Strategy for Growth: City Life in Suburbia, Seattle Times/Seattle
Post-Intelligencer, Jan. 31, 1999, at Al.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 36.70A.040(3)(d), (4)(d), & (5)(d) (1998).
63. See infra notes 92, 97, 100 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., Lutz v. City of Longview, 83 Wash. 2d 566,568-69,520 P.2d 1374, 1376 (1974).
Washington Law Review
comprehensive plans.65 Broadly defined, the comprehensive plan is a
policy guide to a local government's decisions over its community's
physical development.' Local government planners create comprehensive
plans after lengthy research into community growth patterns, infrastructure
needs, employment and population forecasts, and public opinion.67 The
plan lays out the projected development of the community within a certain
timeline, such as six or more years.68 Commentators have described
comprehensive plans as the GMA's "central nervous system" with a
"potency previously unknown in Washington. 69
2. The Consistency Requirement
Post-GMA comprehensive plans derive their substantive power
from the GMA's consistency requirement. This requirement obligates
local governments to make development regulations consistent with
the comprehensive plan.7" Development regulations, including zoning
ordinances, are defined in the Act as controls placed on land use
activities. 7 Although not every county in Washington is required to
65. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 36.70A.040(3)(d), (4)(d), & (5)(d).
66. Hagman & Juergensmeyer, supra note 15, § 2.10, at 24-25.
67. Id. at 27.
68. See Wash. Rev. Code §§ 36.70A.070(3)(d), .070(6)(a)(iii)(C) & (E), &.110(2) (1998).
69. Settle & Gavigan, supra note 2, at 915; see also City of Snoqualmie v. King County, No. 92-
3-0004, 1993 WL 839711, at *11 (Wash. Central Puget Sound Growth Plan. Hrgs. Bd. Mar. 1, 1993)
(describing how GMA plans are different from pre-GMA plans in that GMA creates new and critical
connection between plans, which are policy decisions, and development regulations, which
implement policy decisions).
70. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 36.70A.040(3)(d), (4)(d), & (5)(d). The consistency requirement is also
stated very generally in another section: "Each county and city that is required or chooses to plan
under [the GMA] shall perform its activities.., in conformity with its comprehensive plan." Wash.
Rev. Code § 36.70A.120 (1998). The consistency doctrine also has other meanings. For example, the
GMA imposes four other consistency requirements on jurisdictions that are planning under the Act:
First, a comprehensive plan must be internally consistent. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.070 (1998).
Second, comprehensive plans of one jurisdiction must be consistent with comprehensive plans of
cities and counties with common borders or related regional issues. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.100
(1998). Third, a development regulation must be internally consistent. West Seattle Defense Fund v.
City of Seattle, No. 94-3-0016, 1995 WL 911770, at *9 (Wash. Central Puget. Sound Growth Plan.
Hrgs. Bd. Apr. 4, 1995). Fourth, a development regulation must be consistent with other relevant
development regulations. Alberg v. King County, No. 95-3-0041, 1995 WL 903142, at *20 (Wash.
Central Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hrgs. Bd. Sept. 13, 1995).
71. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.030(7) (1998).
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create a comprehensive plan, consistency is mandated for all munici-
palities that have such plans.72
3. The Foundation for Permitting
In addition, the GMA states that fundamental land use choices made
in comprehensive plans and development regulations shall serve as the
foundation for individual permitting decisions;73 but, it is not clear
whether plans alone may be the basis for permitting decisions. The
statute does not explicitly dictate a procedure for making permit
decisions beyond requiring the consideration of fundamental land use
choices.74 This ambiguity leaves open the question of whether a local
government can base a permitting decision on its comprehensive plan
alone, or whether it must base the decision on a development regulation
such as a zoning ordinance. The statute's language seems to direct local
governments first to their development regulations, stating that a local
government shall base permitting decisions upon the project's
consistency with applicable development regulations.75 But, the section
goes on to say that "in the absence of applicable regulations,"
consistency with the comprehensive plan shall be the foundation of
project review.76 The phrase "or, in the absence of applicable regulations
the adopted comprehensive plan" appears twice in this section, as does a
reference to regulations "or" plans.77 The statute does not explain what
situations might constitute an absence of applicable regulations. It is
72. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 35.63.125, 35A.63.105, & 36.70.545 (1998). Ten counties in the state
currently are not required to plan under the GMA because they do not meet population and growth-
,r-te thresholds. The 29 counties planning under the GMA now contain approximately 94% of the
state's population. Settle & Gavigan, supra note 2, at 872. The 29 counties are Benton, Chelan,
Clallam, Clark, Columbia, Douglas, Ferry, Franklin, Garfield, Grant, Island, Jefferson, King, Kitsap,
Kittitas, Lewis, Mason, Pacific, Pend Oreille, Pierce, San Juan, Skagit, Snohomish, Spokane,
Stevens, Thurston, Walla Walla, Whatcom, and Yakima. Id at 872 n.24.
73. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70B.030(l) (1998).
74. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70B.030(I).
75. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70B.030(1).
76. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70B.030(1).
77. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70B.030(l) & (2) (1998). RCW 36.70B.030(2) states:
During project review, a local government... shall determine whether the items listed in this
subsection are defined in the development regulations applicable to the proposed project or, in
the absence of applicable regulations the adopted comprehensive plan. At a minimum, such
applicable regulations or plans shall be determinative of the [following three things] ....
Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70B.030(2).
Washington Law Review Vol. 74:367, 1999
therefore ambiguous as to when and if local governments can use their
comprehensive plan alone as the basis for permit decisions.
The statute's language in other sections and legislative history are also
pertinent to the question. The GMA defines "project permits" as
including "site-specific rezones authorized by a comprehensive plan. 78
But, it is not clear whether this means site-specific rezones that are
authorized solely by a plan. Finally, the legislative history's statement of
intent consistently refers to both comprehensive plans and development
regulations when discussing what shall be the foundation for permitting
decisions.79
Another aspect of the GMA that may affect the issue is the statute's
bottom-up regulatory approach.8 0 The Central Puget Sound Growth
Hearings Board8 and legal commentators81 maintain that a major goal of
the GMA is to preserve local control over local land use decisions, and
that the state's role is limited to enforcement and support. In fact, the GMA
chapter governing project review explicitly states that nothing in that section
78. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70B.020(4) (1998).
79. The legislative findings state: "If the applicable regulations or plans identify [the following,
then] ... these decisions at a minimum provide the foundation for further project review." 1995
Wash. Laws, ch. 347, § 403, finding 1 (emphasis added). "Consistency should be determined in the
project review process by considering four factors found in applicable regulations orplans .... Ch.
347, § 403, finding 3 (emphasis added). "Given the hundreds of jurisdictions and agencies in the
state and the numerous communities and applicants affected by development regulations and
comprehensive plans adopted under [the GMA], it is essential to establish a uniform framework for
considering the consistency of a proposed project with the applicable regulations orplan." Ch. 347,
§ 403, finding 3 (emphasis added).
80. States with growth management statutes use either a "bottom-up" or "top-down" approach to
their state-wide management of growth. See Settle & Gavigan, supra note 2, at 898; Hong N. Huynh,
Comment, Administrative Forces in Oregon's Land Use Planning and Washington's Growth
Management, 12 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 115, 115 (1997). Bottom-up statutes endeavor to preserve local
governments' autonomy in land-use regulation, whereas top-down statutes impose more state
control. Washington is one such "bottom-up" state, placing the central locus of decision-making at
the local level. Wash. Admin. Code § 365-195-010 (1998); see Wash. Rev. Code §§ 36.70A.040(3),
.040(4), & .120 (1998); see also Settle & Gavigan, supra note 2, at 922 (stating that GMA conferred
new local authority on counties and cities).
81. City of Snoqualmie v. King County, No. 92-3-0004, 1993 WL 839711, at *13 (Wash. Central
Puget Sound Growth Plan. Hrgs. Bd. Mar. 1, 1993) ("[E]ven with the hierarchy ... the GMA
generally, and the CPPs specifically, are premised on local government control. It is still local
governments (cities and counties) not regional or state government, that are invested with the authority
and responsibility to... prepare, adopt and implement comprehensive plans and development
regulations.").
82. See supra note 80.
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dictates an agency's procedures for considering consistency between a
project and the comprehensive plan or development regulations. 3
Despite the GMA's repeated reference to plans in conjunction with
regulations during permit review, as well as its emphasis on local control
of the permitting process, decisions of the Central Puget Sound Board
indicate that the GMA does not contemplate the use of comprehensive
plans alone as the foundation for permitting decisions. The Board has
characterized the GMA as creating a cascading hierarchy of substantive
and directive policy among the statute's decisionmaking documents.' In
City ofSnoqualmie v. King County,"5 the Central Puget Sound Board held
that power flows first from county-wide planning policies (CPPs)"6 to
comprehensive plans, which provide substantive direction to the content
of development regulations.8 7 These in turn govern the exercise of local
land use powers "including zoning, permitting, and enforcement.""8 The
Central Puget Sound Board held that CPPs do not, however, provide
substantive direction to a county's development regulations, which are
two levels down on the hierarchy. 9 Using this reasoning, the Central
Puget Sound Board may not allow comprehensive plans to provide the
sole substantive direction to permitting decisions, which are also two
levels down on the hierarchy.
B. The GMA Encourages Mixed-Use Zoning
Although the emergence of suburban clusters is a recent phenomenon
in Washington, when the Washington Legislature passed the Growth
Management Act, it recognized that communities require a variety of
83. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70B.040(4) (1998) ("Nothing in this section requires documentation,
dictates an agency's procedures for considering consistency, or limits a city or county from asking
more specific or related questions with respect to any of the four main categories listed in... this
section").
84. Aagaard v. City of Bothell, No. 94-3-0011, 1995 WL 903130, at *4 (Wash. Central Puget
Sound Growth Mgmt. Hrgs. Bd. Feb. 21, 1995).
85. 1993 WL839711.
86. CPPs are regional planning agreements made between a county and the cities within it, and
between neighboring counties, that coordinate their comprehensive plans. See Wash. Rev. Code
§ 36.70A.210 (1998).
87. Snoqualmie, 1993 WL 839711, at *13.
88. Id
89. Id.
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uses to be liveable.' One of the thirteen planning goals of the GMA is to
reduce sprawling, low-density development.9 To this end, an entire
chapter of the GMA is devoted to encouraging municipalities to build
more residential units in "urban centers." 92 Also, a key component of the
act is the concept of urban growth areas (UGAs). 93 The act requires that
all counties designate boundaries of UGAs within their jurisdictions and
that they restrict their projected twenty-year population growth to these
UGAs, protecting rural land from urban encroachment.94 Within UGAs,
counties and cities must permit mixed-uses and higher building
densities.9 In other sections, the GMA encourages placing commercial
uses and higher-density housing types in single-family residential zones.
It directs local governments to make provisions for placing accessory
apartments in single-family zones,96 and it states that comprehensive
plans should provide for "innovative land use management techniques"
including planned unit developments.97
The term "planned unit development" (PUD) refers to a large, single-
tract development of mixed-uses that a developer builds as a single
coordinated development. 98 As one commentator remarked, in contrast to
traditional zoning, which segregates uses, the PUD mixes uses to provide
services, a wider variety of housing choices, and neighborhood
recreational amenities.99 Along with its encouragement for PUDs, the
90. See Wash. Rev. Code §§ 36.70A.350(l)(d),.090,.110(2), 43.63A.215(l)(b),.215(3), &
84.14.007. (1998). When legislators began working on the GMA, the Seattle Times/Seattle Post-
Intelligencer ran a series of articles on growth management, called the Peirce Report. See Peirce &
Johnson, supra note 58; Settle & Gavigan, supra note 2, at 942 (listing legislative chronology of
GMA bills, spanning from February 1989 to July 1991). In one of their articles, Peirce and Johnson
advocated compact, pedestrian friendly villages as a way to combat sprawl. Peirce & Johnson, supra
note 58.
91. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.020(2).
92. Wash. Rev. Code § 84.14 (1998). The Act defines urban centers as identifiable urban districts
that contain products and services for urban residents such as shops, offices, banks, and government
offices. Wash. Rev. Code § 84.14.010(10) (1998).
93. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.110 (1998); see Settle & Gavigan, supra note 2, at 872-83.
94. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A. 110; see Settle & Gavigan, supra note 2, at 911-12.
95. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A. 110(2).
96. Wash. Rev. Code § 43.63A.215(3) (1998).
97. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.090 (1998).
98. See Laurie Reynolds, Local Subdivision Regulation: Formulaic Constraints in an Age of
Discretion, 24 Ga. L. Rev. 525, 550 (1990).
99. Id. at 550 (citing Hanke, Planned Unit Development and Land Use Intensity, 114 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 15, 19 (1965)). Another commentator has defined PUDs as districts in which a planned mix of
residential, commercial, and even industrial uses is allowed for the purpose of using the land
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GMA establishes criteria for counties to authorize "fully contained
communities" outside urban growth areas, including the requirement for
those communities to be transit-oriented and to have a mix of uses that
offer jobs, housing, and services to the residents."° Finally, the Central
Puget Sound Board has stated that urban villages, which are mixed-use
zones like PUDs, are one of the strategies contemplated by the GMA's
section on innovative land use management techniques.'0 '
C. Clarification of the Planned Unit Development Concept
The GMA instituted another more minor change to previous common
law by defining the grant of a PUD permit as a permitting decision rather
than an amendment to the zoning ordinance (or a "rezone"). 2 The
difference under the GMA is important because courts applying the Act
could interpret the statute to impose constraints on permitting decisions
that are different from those it imposes on rezones.0 3 In the past,
Washington courts considered PUDs to be rezones because, like
conventional rezoning, PUDs alter the uses permitted on a tract of
land."° But, two sections of the GMA alter the common law conception.
First, the Act defines project permits as including PUDs.0 5 Second, it
defines "development regulations" as including zoning ordinances but
excluding decisions to grant project permit applications.0 6 Thus, the
efficiently, with certain restrictions that ensure compatibility of uses. 2 R. Anderson, American Law
of Zoning § 11.12 (2d ed. 1976).
100. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.350 (1998); see also Wash. Admin. Code § 365-195-335
(3)(l)(i) (1998) (recommending that local governments establish process for reviewing proposals to
authorize new, fully-contained communities when designating urban growth areas).
101. West Seattle Defense Fund v. City of Seattle, No. 94-3-0016, 1995 WL 911770, at *13
(Wash. Central Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hrgs. Bd. Apr. 4, 1995) (discussing Wash. Rev. Code
§ 36.70A.090). Seattle's comprehensive plan discusses how some urban villages are types of mixed-
use housing developments that allow either direct access to jobs and commercial areas or access via
transit. The plan states that urban villages are sometimes intended to transform automobile-oriented
environments into more cohesive, mixed-use pedestrian environments. Id. at *4.
102. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 36.70A.030(7), .70B.020(4) (1998).
103. The GMA's different treatment, if any, between permitting decisions and rezones is an issue
that has not been addressed yet in judicial decisions. See supra Part II.A.3.
104. Lutz v. City of Longview, 83 Wash. 2d 566, 568-69, 520 P.2d 1374, 1376 (1974); see also
Clyde W. Forrest, Planned Unit Development and Takings Post Dolan, 15 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 571,
572-73 (1995) (discussing different ways that states authorize PUDs and how main objectives of
PUDs are to achieve mixtures of uses and reductions in development standards).
105. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70B.020(4).
106. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.030(7).
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GMA considers PUDs to be permitting decisions, not development
regulations or rezones.
III. CITIZENS FOR MOUNT VERNON v. CITY OF MOUNT VERNON
In Mount Vernon, the Supreme Court of Washington held that zoning
trumps conflicting comprehensive plans."7 The city granted a PUD
permit to a developer to build a residential development with a grocery
store and other commercial space on nine of the development's forty
acres.' The PUD conflicted with the site's residential zoning
designation.. but was possibly consistent with the city's comprehensive
plan, which allowed neighborhood community retail in the area."0 The
court invalidated the city's permit approval, holding that "conflicts
between a general comprehensive plan and a specific zoning code [will]
be resolved in the zoning code's favor.''' I
A. Facts and Procedural History
In 1995, a developer requested a permit from the City of Mount
Vernon to build a planned unit development that consisted mainly of
housing but included a grocery store and other commercial space."' The
proposed site was a forty-acre plot of unincorporated land"3 surrounded
by city land.' The facts of the case are somewhat complicated because
two different sets of land use designations were attached to the site
before the application process. First, the forty acres were zoned for
107. Citizens for Mount Vernon v. City of Mount Vernon, 133 Wash. 2d 861, 873, 947 P.2d
1208, 1215 (1997).
108. Id. at 863-64, 947 P.2d at 1210.
109. Id. at 874, 947 P.2d at 1215.
110. The court did not answer the question of whether the permit was consistent with the
comprehensive plan. It only said that "[e]ven if the Haggen commercial PUD generally conformed
to the comprehensive plan, the proposal directly conflicts with the underlying R-2A zoning
regulations." Id. at 876-77, 947 P.2d at 1216. The lower court had held that the project conflicted
even with the comprehensive plan, but the Supreme Court of Washington did not adopt the lower
court's reasoning for this holding. Id. at 865, 947 P.2d at 1211. Also, the opponents of the PUD
claimed it was not a "neighborhood grocery store." Id. at 870, 947 P.2d at 1213.
111. Id. at 865, 947 P.2d at 1210.
112. Id. at 863, 947 P.2d at 1210.
113. Unincorporated land is outside the boundaries of a municipal corporation such as a town or a
city, and is therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of the municipal corporation. See Hagman &
Juergensmeyer, supra note 15, § 21.1, at 628, and § 21.2, at 632.
114. Mount Vernon, 133 Wash. 2d at 863-64, 947 P.2d at 1210.
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commercial use under the county zoning ordinance."' Second, the city's
comprehensive plan designated the forty acres and the surrounding land
as appropriate for residential uses, but also as having a "future potential
need for Neighborhood Community Retail.""' 6 The City had adopted a
comprehensive plan pursuant to the GMA before the developer applied for
the development permits,"' but carried over its existing zoning code rather
than updating the code to conform to its new comprehensive plan."'
When the developer applied for the permits to build the development,
he requested three things. He requested first that the forty acres be
annexed into the city" 9 and second that they be rezoned to residential. 2 0
The developer further requested approval of a commercial PUD to
overlay the entire site, in order to build a grocery store and other
commercial uses on nine of the forty acres.' 2 1 It is not clear why the
developer sought a rezone to residential because, as the court later
discussed, commercial uses were not allowed in residential districts
under the city's zoning code." It is also not clear from the opinion
whether residential uses would have been allowed in a commercial zone
under the city's zoning code. One may speculate, therefore, that because
the City had not updated its zoning code to conform to its comprehensive
plan," a city zoning designation flexible enough to allow the
"neighborhood community retail" contemplated by the comprehensive
plan for the area did not exist. The court's opinion does not specifically
address whether this was the case or not. However, it is clear that the
prior county zoning designation of the site was commercial," 4 and the
developer may have requested a rezone to residential because a
significant portion of his proposed development was residential.
115. Id. at 864, 947 P.2d at 1210.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 863, 947 P.2d at 1210.
118. Id at 863-64, 873, 947 P.2d at 1210, 1214 (stating that before development request, Mount
Vernon City Council adopted new comprehensive plan for city under GMA but at this time council
"had not yet adopted specific development regulations as required by RCW 36.70A.040. Mount
Vernon did have an existing zoning code.").
119. Annexation is the process by which a municipal corporation, such as a town or a city, brings
unincorporated land into its jurisdiction, thus making that land part of the town or city. See Hagman
& Juergensmeyer, supra note 15, § 21.13, at 683.
120. Mount Vernon, 133 Wash. 2d at 863, 947 P.2d at 1210.
121. Id. at 863, 947 P.2d at 1210.
122. Id. at 872, 947 P.2d at 1214.
123. See id at 863-64, 873, 947 P.2d at 1210, 1214.
124. Id at 864, 947 P.2d at 1210.
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The city council voted first to approve the annexation of the forty
acres into the city of Mount Vernon and rezone the site to single-family
residential. 5 It subsequently approved the commercial PUD.126 Some
community residents opposed this decision, however, and petitioned the
superior court to reverse the city's approval of the PUD.'2 7 The superior
court did so, holding that a grocery store and other commercial uses were
not permitted in the residential zone.'28 The superior court reasoned that
the PUD was inconsistent with existing zoning regulations and the
comprehensive plan failed to provide specific standards for making
permitting decisions.'29 The developer appealed directly to the Supreme
Court of Washington, which accepted review.
B. The Supreme Court of Washington's Analysis
The Supreme Court of Washington upheld the superior court's decision
and invalidated the City's action based on pre-GMA common law notions.
First, the court found that although the comprehensive plan would have
allowed the commercial uses, the zoning ordinance trumps the plan when
the two conflict. 30 Second, the court concluded that the single-family
residential zoning designation of the site did not permit the commercial
uses in the PUD, absent a showing of changed circumstances."
The court first addressed the developer's argument that the
comprehensive plan alone was a sufficient basis for the city's approval of
the PUD. The developer cited the GMA's language stating that decisions
to grant project permits can be based on comprehensive plans in the
absence of applicable development regulations.'32 In this case, the
residential zoning designation of the site did not allow neighborhood
community retail, but the comprehensive plan established that the area
needed it. The developer argued that the plan was appropriately the basis
125. Id. at 865, 947 P.2d at 1210.
126. Id.
127. Id. The land use petition is the process under the GMA that allows citizens to seek judicial
review of local land use decisions. This process replaces the writ system. See Land Use Petition Act,
Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70C.030 (1998).
128. Mount Vernon, 133 Wash. 2d at 865, 947 P.2d at 1210-11.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 873, 947 P.2d at 1215.
131. Id. at 877, 947 P.2d at 1216.
132. Id. at 873, 947 P.2d at 1214.
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of the permitting decision.' The court conceded that the GMA's
language suggested a comprehensive plan alone could be used to make a
specific land use decision, but then said that case law holds otherwise.'34
The court stated that a comprehensive plan is not designed for making
specific land use decisions.' It then repeated the pre-GMA legal mantra
that a comprehensive plan is a guide or blueprint for land use decisions
and strict adherence to it is not required.'36 Relying on another pre-GMA
case, the court also noted that a zoning ordinance will prevail over an
inconsistent comprehensive plan.'37
The court then addressed the developer's argument that the grant of
the PUD was a rezone, and that the city's comprehensive plan mandated
rezoning as part of the PUD process.' The developer claimed that the
fact that the PUD was a rezone made the underlying zoning designation
immaterial to the city's decision to grant the PUD permit.'39 The court
agreed that under common law doctrine, the legal effect of approving a
PUD is an act of rezoning 40 It applied the common law rules governing
rezoning 4' but did not investigate whether those rules still apply after the
GMA. The court held that the city's decision failed the common law
requirements for constitutional rezoning actions.'4 2 It stated that the grant
of the commercial PUD permit in a residential zone was not valid
because the area had not changed in circumstances since the original
zoning. 43 The PUD decision represented spot zoning,'" according to the
133. Id. at 872-73, 947 P.2d at 1214.
134. Id. at 873, 947 P.2d at 1214.
135. Id at 873, 947 P.2d at 1214-15 (citing Barrie v. Kitsap County, 93 Wash. 2d 843, 613 P.2d
1148 (1980)).
136. Id, 947 P.2d at 1214-15.
137. Id, 947 P.2d at 1215 (citing Cougar Mountain Assocs. v. King County, 111 Wash. 2d 742,
757,765 P.2d 264,272 (1988)).
138. Id. at 874, 947 P.2d at 1215.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 875, 947 P.2d at 1215.
142. Id. at 874-75, 877, 947 P.2d at 1215-16.
143. Id. at 877, 947 P.2d at 1216. A showing of changed circumstances is one of the traditional
requirements for valid rezoning. Parkridge v. City of Seattle, 89 Wash. 2d 454, 462, 573 P.2d 359,
364 (1978).
144. Spot zoning is a common law concept that refers to illegal rezoning. It occurs when a rezone
is done at the behest of a private interest and bears no rational relationship to the public welfare. A
court will find spot zoning if a relatively small area is rezoned for a use totally different from or
inconsistent with the surrounding zoning. Lutz v. City of Longview, 83 Wash. 2d 566, 573-74, 520
P.2d 1374, 1379 (1980).
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court, because the commercial use the developer proposed was
inconsistent with, and distinctly different from, the surrounding
neighborhood zoning of residential use."
IV. MOUNT VERNON INAPPROPRIATELY RELIED ON PRE-GMA
LEGAL RULES
The court's reliance on anachronistic common law in Mount Vernon
undermined the GMA's modem approach. The court's decision reflects
land use law's traditional disregard for comprehensive planning and its
focus on single-use zoning, both of which are antiquated notions under
the GMA.' 46 The facts and issues raised by the parties in Mount Vernon
provided a missed opportunity to clarify whether comprehensive plans
alone can serve as the basis of permitting decisions when zoning
ordinances are deficient. In future cases the court should consider
bifurcating the judicial standard of review for land use actions into
general and specific land use decisions.
A. The Court Erroneously Displayed the Traditional Aversion to
Mixed-Use Zoning
The court's decision in Mount Vernon failed to acknowledge the
GMA's preference for mixed-use zoning and innovative land-use
techniques, such as planned unit developments, to manage growth."'4
PUDs reduce automobile trip distances and conserve open space by
putting retail services closer to the homeowners who use them.'48 The
GMA's statement that local governments "should" rather than "canf
provide for such techniques underscores the GMA's preference for
innovative techniques.'49 Although regrettable, the court's insistence on
keeping commercial uses out of an area zoned for single-family residential
145. Mount Vernon, 133 Wash. 2d at 876, 947 P.2d at 1216. The court cited an earlier Supreme
Court of Washington case, Lutz, in support of its definition of spot zoning. However, the court in
Mount Vernon did not mention that the Lutz definition of spot zoning entailed rezones that were
inconsistent with a comprehensive plan. The rezone in Mount Vernon was consistent with the plan.
See Lutz, 83 Wash. 2d at 573-74, 520 P.2d at 1379 ("Spot zoning has come to mean arbitrary and
unreasonable zoning action by which a smaller area is singled out of a larger area.., and [is] not in
accordance with the comprehensive plan.") (citation omitted).
146. See discussion supra Part L.A-B.
147. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
149. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.090 (1998).
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housing' is understandable because it reflects land use law's eighty-year-
old homogeneous zoning standard.' But, this standard is a bane on
society under present conditions of traffic gridlock and disappearing
natural resource lands.' The planned unit development in Mount Vernon
was the type of mixed-use development the GMA encourages; it would
have created a suburban village where residents would not have had to
drive far, if at all, to get groceries and necessary services.
B. The Court Relied on Outdated Case Law and Failed to Reconcile
the Comprehensive Plan and Development Regulations
The Mount Vernon decision also inappropriately invoked outdated
legal standards to conclude that zoning trumps inconsistent compre-
hensive plans.' The court's reliance on the common law precept that the
plan is only advisory ignored the fact that the GMA reversed the
relationship between comprehensive plans and development regulations,
such that plans now trump zoning ordinances when the two conflict. 54
The court should have devised a solution that honored the comprehensive
plan's replacement of the zoning ordinance as the substantive document
of local land use regulation.
The erroneous use of pre-GMA case law allowed the court to avoid
remedying the fact that the city had not updated its zoning code to be
consistent with its comprehensive plan. The court's use of pre-GMA case
law channeled its attention to the PUD permit's inconsistency with the
zoning code. Under the GMA, however, its focus should have been on
the zoning code's inconsistency with the comprehensive plan. If the
court had applied the correct focus, it would have addressed the illegal
inconsistency between Mount Vernon's comprehensive plan and its
zoning ordinance. The city's zoning ordinance did not permit
neighborhood community retail at the site of the proposed development,
while the comprehensive plan allowed it.' Unless courts enforce
remedies for inconsistency, the strength of a statutory consistency
150. Mount Vernon, 133 Wash. 2d at 876, 947 P.2d at 1216.
151. See supra Part I.B.
152. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
153. Dearborn, supra note 7.
154. See supra notes 16-19, 32, 69-72 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
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requirement is severely curtailed. 5 6 In other states, judicial remedies for
inconsistency between the plan and the zoning code include invalidating
the zoning ordinance,"5 7 enjoining the issuance of building permits,'58
reprimanding the local government,5 9 and setting aside a subdivision
approval until an adequate comprehensive plan has been adopted. 6° An
appropriate remedy in Mount Vernon would have been to enjoin this
particular PUD permit until the City updated its zoning code.
Alternatively, the court could have placed a moratorium on development
permits generally until the City updated its zoning code to be consistent
with its comprehensive plan. 6 '
C. The Court Should Have Clarified Whether Comprehensive Plans
Can Serve as the Exclusive Foundation of Permitting Decisions
1. The Court's Failure to Clarify Represents a Missed Opportunity
The court focused on pre-GMA case law, avoiding whether the GMA,
as opposed to Washington case law, allows a local government to grant a
project permit based on its comprehensive plan alone. The court stated
that the GMA suggests that a comprehensive plan can be used to make a
specific land use decision; 162 but, the court used prior case law rather
than the statute itself to resolve the issue.6 The GMA states that the
foundation for project permit decisions shall be development regulations,
or in the absence of applicable regulations, a locality's comprehensive
plan."6 The developer argued that this section made the city's grant of
the PUD permit valid because the PUD permit was consistent with the
156. Joseph F. DiMento, The Consistency Doctrine and the Limits of Planning 23, 25 (1980)
(stating that without injunctive remedies and with local governmental control of review for
consistency, consistency doctrine becomes meaningless).
157. See Manley v. Maysville, 528 S.W.2d 726, 278 (Ky. 1975).
158. DiMento, supra note 156, at 24.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. The weakness of this remedy would be the significant delay it would cause for all land
owners wishing to develop, but it would effectively motivate the City to act quickly in updating its
zoning ordinance.
162. Citizens for Mount Vernon v. City of Mount Vernon, 133 Wash. 2d 861, 873, 947 P.2d
1208, 1214 (1997).
163. See id. at 873, 947 P.2d at 1214-15.
164. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
Vol. 74:367, 1999
Growth Management Act
comprehensive plan. 6 The court disagreed, finding that prior case law
had established that comprehensive plans generally do not serve as a
basis for individual permitting decisions.'66
The court should have based its decision on the governing statute, not
prior case law, because the GMA changed the equation significantly.
Before the GMA, local governments perhaps should not have based their
specific land use decisions on comprehensive plans because those plans
were not substantive documents.167 Modem GMA plans, however, are
substantive, sophisticated, and regulated by state law more than any
previous comprehensive plans.'68 This reduces the danger that permitting
decisions based on plans alone would be arbitrary and capricious because
of a lack of specific directives. Furthermore, GMA zoning ordinances are
not policy documents. Their purpose, rather, is to effectuate the policies
of comprehensive plans. Consistency with a comprehensive plan should
be the ultimate test of any local government's action, whether specific or
general in nature, because the GMA requires consistency. 69 The GMA
changed the legal landscape, making the old common law rules irrelevant
to the question of whether comprehensive plans alone can serve as the
basis for permitting decisions.
2. The GMA Indicates that Comprehensive Plans Can Be the
Exclusive Basis for Some Permitting Decisions
Several features of the GMA suggest that comprehensive plans can be
the exclusive foundation of some permitting decisions. First, the GMA
uses a bottom-up approach, whereby the central locus of decisionmaking
is at the local level. 7 Drafters of the GMA may have intentionally left
out explicit direction in the matter to preserve local governments' control
over-their own methods of permit decisionmaking. A major theme of the
GMA is local control of land use decisions.' Notably, the GMA chapter
governing project review explicitly states that nothing in that section
dictates an agency's procedures for considering consistency between a
165. Mount Vernon, 133 Wash. 2d at 871-73, 947 P.2d at 1213-14.
166. Id. at 873, 947 P.2d at 1214.
167. See Settle, supra note 17, § 1.5, at 8.
168. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text; see also Settle & Gavigan, supra note 2,
at 873.
169. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
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project and the comprehensive plan or development regulations.'72 This
suggests that the GMA intends local governments to have discretion in
creating their own permitting process, as long as their decisions are
consistent with their comprehensive plan in the end.
Second, aspects of the GMA's language and its legislative history
suggest that plans can serve as the sole foundation of project review in
certain circumstances. The Act's chapter on project review consistently
refers to comprehensive plans "in the absence of applicable regulations"
when it discusses the foundations for project review.173 The legislative
history's statement of intent also consistently refers to "regulations or
plans" in discussing what local governments should consider when
reviewing projects.'74 The fact that the drafters of the GMA linked plans
with regulations throughout the chapter suggests that permit decisions
can be based on plans or regulations and that the statute leaves the final
choice to the local government. In another section, the GMA defines
"project permits" as including "site-specific rezones authorized by a
comprehensive plan."'75 Developers frequently apply for a rezone if they
want to build a development that current zoning does not allow.'76 Such
requests are therefore site-specific rezones. As with PUDs, the GMA
defines project permits as including site-specific rezones but not
development regulations.'77 Both definitions suggest an intent to establish
some kind of hierarchy between specific and general decisions at the
local level. Finally, the phrase "authorized by a comprehensive plan"
leaves open the possibility that within this hierarchy, some types of
permit decisions can be based on the comprehensive plan alone.
172. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70B.040(4) (1998) ("Nothing in this section requires documentation,
dictates an agency's procedures for considering consistency, or limits a city or county from asking
more specific or related questions with respect to any of the four main categories listed in ... this
section.").
173. See supra note 79.
174. See supra note 79.
175. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70B.020(4) (1998) (emphasis added).
176. See The Practice of Local Government Planning 258 (Frank S. So & Judith Getzels eds., 2d
ed. 1988) (stating that zoning law is different from all other areas of American administrative law in
that requests for amendments to the law are so frequent that there are specific application forms and
fee schedules for rezoning requests).
177. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70B.020(4).
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D. Local Governments Should Be Able to Issue PUD Permits Based on
the Comprehensive Plan
Some site-specific decisions at the local level by nature require using
the comprehensive plan as the sole foundation for the decision. Planned
unit developments, for example, are by definition inconsistent with prior
zoning.' PUDs change the uses allowed on a parcel from what the
original zoning permitted.'79 A decision to grant a PUD permit will
therefore never be consistent with applicable development regulations,
and must be based on the comprehensive plan's designation for the area.
Any site-specific rezone in which a developer has approached the local
government requesting the rezone would fall into this same category.
The GMA seems to have contemplated this situation when it defined
both PUDs and site-specific rezones to be project permits rather than
development regulations 80
E. The Court Should Adopt a Stricter Standard of Judicial Review for
Site-Specific Decisions
To address the court's concerns that the plan is too general to be used
for specific land use decisions, the court should bifurcate the judicial
standard of review as between general and specific land use actions, as
other state courts have done.' To prevent political favoritism, the court
should apply a strict scrutiny standard to permitting decisions and
rezones initiated by a landowner, while according the looser, fairly
debatable standard to all other rezones. This bifurcation would preserve
the authority of the comprehensive plan and would also preserve local
control over the permitting process. Finally, it would address the court's
concerns that the plan is too general to be used for specific land use
decisions."' Local governments subject to a strict scrutiny standard of
review would be much more hesitant to issue a permit unless there
existed a strong foundation upon which to defend the decision.
178. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
180. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70B.020(4).
181. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
182. See Citizens for Mount Vernon v. City of Mount Vernon, 133 Wash. 2d 861, 873, 947 P.2d
1208, 1214-15 (1997).
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V. CONCLUSION
The court's major mistake in Mount Vernon was its failure to
recognize the new preeminence of the comprehensive plan. The GMA
comprehensive plan replaces the old comprehensive zoning ordinance as
the principal tool of land use regulation. The court also echoed the
eighty-year-old American aversion to mixed-use zoning when it
invalidated a permit for what essentially would have been a suburban
village. The state enacted the GMA to counteract growth-related
problems such as traffic congestion and loss of natural resource lands.
Suburban villages are one of the innovative regulatory tools that use land
more efficiently and help reduce automobile trips.
The court's reasoning in Mount Vernon probably will not appear
again, however. It has been almost ten years since the passage of the
GMA. Since its 1997 decision in Mount Vernon, the court undoubtedly
has become more informed of the GMA's departure from seventy years
of single-use zoning and disregard for planning.'83 For Washington State,
therefore, Mount Vernon may represent the end of an era.
183. The outcome in Mount Vernon may merely be due to the court's lack of experience with the
GMA, and with time, common law will catch up to the reforms made by the statute. An analogous,
although non-judicial, situation occurred with Oregon's Comprehensive Growth Management
System. It took 12 years for the state's local governments to implement it fully, but it is now
working well and is supported by the public. See John M. DeGrove & Nancy E. Stroud, New
Developments and Future Trends in Local Government Comprehensive Planning, 17 Stetson L. Rev.
573, 574 (1988).
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